Abstract-Distributed energy resources, featured with smallscale power generation technologies and renewable energy sources, have been considered as a necessary supplement for the smart grid. In order to make the merged power grid to be still smart, the data generated at the consumer side should be shared among the energy resources. However, this approach brings difficulties on how to protect consumers' privacy. To deal with the problem, in this paper, we propose a new framework for data sharing in the smart grid by using a combination of homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption techniques. The proposed framework allows the energy resources to be able to analyze the consumers' data while keeping the consumers' privacy. Another good property of our proposed framework is that the consumers' data is transmitted over the smart grid only once. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is first attempt to consider an important problem concerning data sharing in the smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid systems across the world have experienced catastrophic failure and blackout many times [1] . However, sometimes a power outage is caused by a defect in the electricity network within a small area. The power outage in the east coast of the United States and Canada in 2003, leaving 50 million people living in the dark for days, shows a perfect example of exactly what happens when a simple point defect in the grid is not dealt with properly and timely. In 2003, a power transmission line is tripped out due to tree contact in Cleveland, US. Making matters worse is that nearby lines become overloaded due to the power rerouted from the failed line, and eventually sagged from excess heat and tripped their circuit breakers after contacting a tree. It leads to a cascading failure of the power supply network in the Northeast US and part of Canada [2] . Besides, there are many other conditions that can cause power failure, for example, the overloading of mains electrical circuits. When electricity consumption is high during a hot summer day and is exceeding electric utility capacity, it is inevitable to either reduce energy usage by turning off some appliances during peak hours or bring in additional power sources. If this is not the case, the overloaded power grid could fail, resulting in a blackout. It is thus important to monitor the power grid system real-timely so that we can promptly and effectively react to any abnormality in power grid.
Recently, smart grid becomes a buzz word since it supports effective real-time diagnosis and healing to avoid failures and [4] - [7] . The main difference between the smart grid and the traditional power grid is the information flows. In the traditional power grid, there only exist the one-way electrical flows, i.e., electricity utilities only deliver power to consumers. While in the smart grid, there additionally exists a two-way information flow communication. As shown in Fig. 1 , in the smart grid, the two-way information flows are almost parallel to the one-way power flows, except that the control center is also involved in the information flows. The control center can adjust the power grid, such as the amount of power generation in the next period, based on the statistics and analysis of electricity consumption reports from the consumers. It is fair to say that the collected electricity consumption reports are the key to allow the smart grid to be truly smart.
On the other hand, the collected electricity consumption reports should be of encryption form when they are transmitted over the smart grid since they are the part of consumers' privacy [3] . Otherwise, security and privacy concerns from electricity customers could become a major barrier to adopting such a great technology, which can make our power grid smarter and more reliable, resilient, and environmentally friendly. When there exists only an energy source, we can handle this problem using ordinary encryption schemes, since the only one control center is usually controlled by the government and it can be considered as a trusted party. However, the real situation is not so simple, especially the distributed energy resources, featured with small-scale power generation technologies and renewable energy sources, have been considered as a necessary supplement for the smart grid [8] , [9] . It is also known as "micro-grid". Furthermore, not all the distributed energy resources are under the control of the government, hence it is not acceptable that all of them are trusted. Now, we are in a dilemma that the electricity consumption reports should be analyzed by the energy resources while the individual data can be still protected. One trivial solution is to anonymize the data before being sent to the energy resources for analysis. However, it will significantly increase the communication cost since the massive anonymized data should be sent to every resource and there could be also a lot of resources in an area. A possible improvement is to let some third party to do the analysis instead of the energy resources, and only the analysis results are sent to the energy resources. Nevertheless, the third party would also know the analysis results, which is not desired for the energy resources due to some business reasons. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient approach so far to this problem in the context of privacy-preserving smart grid.
In this paper, aiming at addressing the above challenge, we propose a framework for data sharing in the smart grid. The contributions of this paper are twofold.
• First, we propose a novel data sharing framework for the smart grid, where we combine the two popular infrastructures: the smart grid and cloud computing together.
In particular, we allow the electricity consumption reports generated in the smart grid to be stored in the cloud, and the distributed energy resources can obtain the statistics and analysis results from the cloud computing. Hence, our proposed framework can take advantages of cloud computing for the smart grid.
• Second, our proposed framework makes use of the homomorphic encryption technique to facilitate the statistics and analysis on the encrypted electricity consumption reports, and the proxy re-encryption technique to keep the statistics and analysis results secret from the cloud. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present the system model, security model, and the design goal. Then, we propose the data sharing framework in Section III, followed by the security analysis and performance evaluation in Section IV. We also present related works in Section V. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VI.
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we present the system model, security model, and design goal.
A. System Model
In this paper, we only focus on how the electricity consumption reports are securely shared among the distributed generation resources. In particular, we take advantages of The proposed data sharing framework for the smart grid the data-as-a-service (DaaS) model in the cloud computing, where the system is composed of the following parties: the trusted authority (TA), many electricity consumers (ECs), many distributed energy resources (DERs) and the cloud server as shown in Fig. 2 . The TA is responsible for generating the system parameters and its public/private key pair, as well as delegating the analysis rights on the encrypted electricity consumption reports to the DERs. The ECs produce the electricity consumption reports that are outsourced to the cloud server. To achieve the confidentiality of electricity consumption reports, they should be encrypted by using the public key of the TA.
The DER who has the analysis rights granted from the TA can obtain the analysis results of electricity consumption reports from the cloud server.
B. Security Model
We assume that the cloud server is honest-but-curious as many literatures related to cloud computing [10] - [12] . That is to say, the cloud server will follow the proposed framework faithfully, but could launch passive attacks to get secret information as much as possible. In particular, the cloud server is interested in getting the content of electricity consumption reports or analysis results, but they won't modify the communication data with other entities or collude with other entities. DERs want to get the analysis results from the cloud server so that they can plan more effectively and efficiently to produce an adequate supply of electricity to serve their local needs. It plays an important role in making our power grid more reliable and resilient since we must balance the grid by matching electricity supply with demand exactly to avoid power grid failure and blackout. Meanwhile, DERs would also try to access electricity consumption reports or get the analysis results beyond their analysis rights.
C. Design Goal
Our design goal is to develop a data sharing framework for the smart grid. It has the following desirable properties.
• DaaS model: The proposed framework takes advantages of the DaaS model in the cloud computing, which can save much hardware and software maintaining cost for the smart grid, and the communication cost in the smart grid.
• Privacy preservation: The proposed framework should achieve privacy requirements of ECs. In particular, i) the electricity consumption reports stored in the cloud server cannot be revealed to anyone except the TA; ii) the analysis results cannot be revealed to the one who has no corresponding analysis rights.
III. PROPOSED DATA SHARING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our data sharing framework, which consists of four parts: system initialization, reports creation, analysis grant, and reports analysis. Before plugging into the details, we first review the preliminaries, including homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption, which will serve as the basis of our proposed framework.
A. Preliminaries 1) Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic encryption [13] is a special form of encryption that allows anyone with ciphertexts of messages (m 1 , · · · , m t ) to output a ciphertext of message f (m 1 , · · · , m t ) for some desired function f without knowing the decryption key. If the function f could be any function, then the homomorphic encryption is a fully homomorphic encryption. A concrete homomorphic encryption scheme is composed of the following four algorithms.
• HE.KeyGen: The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input, and outputs the public/private key pair (pk, sk).
• HE.Enc: The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes public key pk and a message m from the message space M as input, and outputs the ciphertext c.
• HE.Dec: The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes the private key sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs the corresponding message m.
• HE.Eva: The evaluation algorithm is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that takes the public key pk, a set of ciphertexts on messages (m 1 , · · · , m t ), and a evaluation function f as input, and outputs the ciphertext c on f (m 1 , · · · , m t ). The correctness of a homomorphic encryption scheme should satisfy the following two requirements for HE.KeyGen(λ) → (pk, sk).
HE.Dec(sk, HE.Enc(pk, m)) = m, and HE.Dec(sk, HE.Eva(pk, {HE.Enc(pk, mi)}
2) Proxy Re-encryption: Proxy re-encryption [14] is a special kind of public key encryption, which allows a semitrusted proxy with some information to transform a ciphertext under one public key into another ciphertext under another public key. However, the corresponding message cannot be revealed during the transformation process. A concrete proxy re-encryption scheme is composed of the following five algorithms.
• PRE.KeyGen: The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input, and outputs the public/private key pair (pk, sk).
• PRE.Enc: The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes public key pk and a message m from the message space M as input, and outputs the ciphertext c.
• PRE.Dec: The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes the private key sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs the corresponding message m.
• PRE.ReKey: The re-encryption key algorithm is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that takes one public/private key pair (pk 1 , sk 1 ) and another public key pk 2 as input, and outputs the corresponding re-encryption key rk.
• PRE.ReEnc: The re-encryption algorithm is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that takes a ciphertext c 1 under public key pk 1 , and a re-encryption key rk corresponding to the delegation from pk 1 to pk 2 as input, and outputs the ciphertext c 2 under public key pk 2 . The correctness of a proxy re-encryption scheme should satisfy the following two requirements for any PRE.KeyGen(λ) → (pk, sk).
PRE.Dec(sk, PRE.Enc(pk, m)) = m, and PRE.Dec(sk2, PRE.ReEnc(PRE.ReKey(pk1, sk1, pk2), c1)) = m, where c 1 is the ciphertext corresponding to m under public key pk 1 , and it can be from algorithm PRE.Enc or algorithm PRE.ReEnc.
B. Main Idea
The main idea in our proposed framework is twofold. In order to protect consumers' privacy in the electricity consumption reports, these reports should be encrypted before uploading to the cloud server. Firstly, we make use of homomorphic encryption technique to allow the cloud server to do the statistics and analysis on the encrypted electricity consumption reports for the distributed energy resources. Only the encrypted statistics and analysis is required to be sent from the cloud server to the distributed energy resources. This step allows the smart grid to save the network bandwidth compared to the case that the anonymized reports are sent directly to the distributed energy resources, which is a widely used practice today to share privacy sensitive survey data. Secondly, we take advantages of proxy re-encryption to allow the distributed energy resources to obtain the statistics and analysis without revealing the private key of the TA to the distributed energy resources. In particular, the cloud server acts as the proxy in proxy re-encryption to transform the ciphertexts of the statistics and analysis under the TA's public key into other ciphertexts under the public key of the distributed energy resource. As a result, the distributed energy resources can obtain the statistics and analysis by using their own private key.
C. Description of the Proposed Framework 1) System Initialization: In this phase, the TA chooses a security parameter λ and obtains key pair (pk ta , sk ta ) by running HE.KeyGen(λ). We further require that (pk ta , sk ta ) falls into the key pairs space of the underlying proxy reencryption scheme. Meanwhile, every distributed energy resource also obtains its own key pair (pk der , sk der ) by running PRE.KeyGen(λ). The TA publishes pk ta or the device (such as smart meter) at the consumer side is implemented with pk ta .
2) Reports Creation: Before uploading the electricity consumption reports to the cloud server, the consumer encrypts the electricity consumption reports m by running HE.Enc(pk ta , m) → c. The encrypted reports are stored on the cloud server in the format as shown in Fig. 3 , where ID contains the necessary information to identify the reports, such as address.
ID HE.Enc(pk ta , m) Fig. 3 : Format of an encrypted report stored on the cloud server 3) Analysis Grant: In this phase, the distributed energy resource will obtain the analysis rights from the TA. Besides these two entities, the cloud server will also be involved in this phase. The details are as follows.
• After authentication by the TA, the DER sends the request containing ID and evaluation function f , where ID shows the range of reports it wants to analyze.
• The TA first decides whether the DER could have the analysis rights on the reports corresponding to ID by using the evaluation function f . If yes, the TA generates a certificate cert on (pk der , ID, f); otherwise, the TA aborts this phase.
• The TA generates the re-encryption key rk corresponding to pk der by running PRE.ReKey(pk ta , sk ta , pk der ), and sends (rk, pk der ) to the cloud server via a secure and authenticated channel.
• On receiving (rk, pk der ) from the TA, the cloud server records the values with an encryption format in the reencryption key list. 4) Reports Analysis: In this phase, the DER obtains the statistics and analysis results from the cloud server. The details are as follows.
• The DER sends its certificate cert to the cloud server via an authenticated channel.
• Upon receiving the information from the DER, the cloud server checks the validity. If it is, the cloud server does the next step; otherwise, it aborts this phase.
• The cloud server collects the ciphertext set C corresponding to ID, and computes the encrypted statistics and analysis results c by running HE.Eva(pk ta , C, f).
• The cloud server finds the re-encryption key rk corresponding to pk der from the re-encryption key list.
• The cloud server transforms the ciphertext c under public key pk ta into another ciphertext c under public key pk der by running PRE.ReEnc(rk, c ), and sends the ciphertext c to the DER via an authenticated channel. Note that in this step, we require that c falls into the ciphertext space of the underlying proxy re-encryption scheme.
• At last, the DER can obtain the statistics and analysis results f (m 1 , · · · , m t ) from c by running PRE.Dec(sk der , c ). 5) Discussion on the Proposed Framework: Careful readers may find that we require two conditions for the well execution of the proposed framework. In particular, i) (pk ta , sk ta ) falls into the key pairs space of the underlying proxy re-encryption scheme, which allows PRE.ReKey to work well; ii) the output of HE.Eva(pk ta , C, f) falls into the output space of PRE.Enc, which allows PRE.ReEnc in the reports analysis phase to work well. However, none of the existing homomorphic encryption schemes and proxy re-encryption schemes satisfy the above two conditions naturally. In this subsection, we show that every homomorphic encryption scheme can be transformed to the satisfied one by an example using ElGamal encryption that only supports multiplicative homomorphism. The details are as follows.
The system parameters are (G, q, g, H) , where G is a finite cyclic group with a big prime order q, g is a generator of G, and H is cryptographic secure hash function H : G → Z q .
• HE.KeyGen (PRE.KeyGen): Randomly choose x from Z q , and set the key pair as (pk, sk) = (g x , x).
• HE.Enc (PRE.Enc): On input a message m from G and a public key pk, it outputs the ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ) as follows. c 1 = g r , c 2 = pk r ta · m where r is a random element from Z q .
• HE.Eva: On input two ciphertext c = (g r1 , pk r1 ta · m 1 ) and c = (g r2 , pk
r ta ·m ), where r 3 is a random element from Z q , r = r 1 + r 2 + r 3 mod q, and m = m 1 · m 2 .
• PRE.ReKey: On input one key pair (pk ta , sk ta , pk der ), it outputs rk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ) = (sk ta /t mod q, H(pk skta der ) · t) as the corresponding re-encryption key.
• PRE.ReEnc: On input a ciphertext c = (g r , pk r ta · m) and rk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ) = (sk ta /t mod q, H(pk skta der ) · t) corresponding to the delegation from pk ta to pk der , it outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext c = ((g r ) rk1 , pk r ta · m, rk 2 ), where t is a random element from Z q .
• PRE.Dec: On input a ciphertext c and a private key, it outputs m as follows. ) . Note that the private key should be sk der in this case. Note that we do not need the algorithm HE.Dec or PRE.Dec with the case of c = (c 1 , c 2 ) in our framework, since the DER always do the decryption on the ciphertext with the format c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) . Theorem 1. The above scheme is CPA-secure under the DDH assumption. In particular, the adversary cannot decide that a ciphertext is corresponding to which message between two given messages with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: We show if there exists an adversary A breaking the CPA security of the above scheme, we can build another algorithm B solving the DDH problem, i.e., on input (g, g a , g b , g c ), decide whether a = bc. We assume that the adversary would issue only one query for the same content. The details are as follows.
• Setup: In this phase, B sets the public key of the TA is pk ta = (g a ) wta , and publishes it to A, where w ta is a random element in Z q .
• Phase 1: In this phase, A can issue the following queries adaptively.
-Random oracle: On input R from G, B first checks whether (R, R ) exists in the hash table T h . If yes, return R to A; otherwise, choose a random element R from Z q and return it to A. At last, B records the new pair (R, R ) into the hash table T h . -Public key oracle: On input an index i, B first sets θ = 0 with probability δ, and randomly chooses w der from Z q . If θ = 0, B returns pk der = g w der ; otherwise, B returns pk der = (g b ) w der . At last, B records the new tuple (pk der , w der , θ) into the key table T k .
-Private key oracle: On input pk der , if pk der has appeared in the query to re-encryption generation oracle, then B refuses to respond this query; otherwise, B does the following steps. If the value θ in the key table T k is corresponding pk der is 0, then B returns w der ; otherwise, B aborts. -Re-encryption key generation oracle: On input (pk ta , pk der ), if pk der has appeared in the query to private key oracle, then B refuses to respond this query; otherwise, B does the following steps. B chooses two random elements (R, R ) from Z q and returns them to A. -Re-encryption oracle: On input (pk ta , pk der , c), if pk der has appeared in the query to private key oracle, then B refuses to respond this query; otherwise, B does the following steps. B first obtains the corresponding re-encryption key as that in the re-encryption key generation oracle, and then runs PRE.Enc to obtain the expected re-encrypted ciphertext and returns it to A.
• Challenge phase: A sends two messages m 0 , m 1 and a public key pk der to B. If the value θ in the key table T k is corresponding pk der is 0, B aborts; otherwise, B generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
where (R, R ) are random elements from Z q , and b is a random value from {0, 1}. If g c = g ab , we have that
Note that the adversary cannot distinguish (R, R ) from the real re-encryption key due to the DDH assumption and the random oracle.
• Phase 2: Identical to Phase 1.
• Guess: A outputs b . If b = b , then B decides that a = bc holds; otherwise, a = bc does not hold.
If B has not aborted, the above simulation is perfect. While B has not aborted with probability 1/e at least according to the analysis in [15] .
Hence, we obtain the theorem.
IV. ANALYSIS ON THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give the security analysis and performance analysis of the proposed frame.
A. Security Analysis
In the proposed framework, the reports are encrypted by the homomorphic encryption. Hence, only if the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme is secure, the consumer's privacy in the reports can be guaranteed. On the other hand, the statistics and analysis results are encrypted by the proxy reencryption. Hence, only if the underlying proxy re-encryption scheme is secure, the confidentiality of the results can be guaranteed.
B. Performance Analysis
In our framework, the TA only needs to generate a certificate and re-encryption key for each DER, and the communication cost is only related to these two types of data. The cloud server needs to verify the certificate, run algorithms HE.Eva and PRE.ReEnc for every query from the DER, and the communication cost is related to these three types of data. As for the consumer side, the computation cost and communication cost is quite simple, and it is only related to HE.Enc. Regarding the DER side, the computation cost is mainly related to PRE.Dec.
As shown above, the performance of our proposed framework is mainly up to the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme and proxy re-encryption scheme. While the proposed framework itself is quite simple and easy to analyze.
V. RELATED WORK
The proposed framework is mainly related to "access control of outsourced data". In this section we will review some of these related works.
Yu et al. [12] proposed a secure, scalable and fine-grained data access control system on the cloud server by using keypolicy attribute-based encryption, proxy re-encryption, and lazy re-encryption. Wang et al. [11] proposed a searchable and privacy-preserving data access control system over outsourced cloud data by using searchable encryption. Recently, Shao et al. [10] proposed a secure, scalable, searchable and finegrained data access control system in cloud computing for mobile devices by using ciphertext-policy anonymous attributebased encryption, proxy re-encryption, lazy re-encryption, and transformation key. However, none of the above systems supports evaluation on the ciphertexts.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a data sharing framework for the smart grid. The proposed framework mainly studies how to keep the smart grid still smart in the sense that electricity consumption reports can be analyzed by the distributed energy resources, while the consumer's privacy in the reports can still be protected. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework is the first attempt to consider the above problem, and a possible solution has been given by using a combination of homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption techniques.
